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Abstract 
 
 Although chronically ill individuals need protection against high medical expenses, they often 
have difficulty obtaining adequate insurance coverage due to medical underwriting practices used to 
classify and price risks and to define and limit coverage for individuals and groups.  Using data from 
healthy and chronically ill individuals in Indiana, we found that illness decreased the probability of having 
adequate insurance, particularly among single individuals. Chronic illness decreased the probability of 
having adequate coverage by about 10 percentage points among all individuals and by about 25 
percentage points among single individuals.  Preexisting condition exclusions were a major source of 
inadequate insurance.  Our results emphasize the impact of enforcing the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1997, which limits preexisting condition exclusions. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Although seriously or chronically ill individuals generally need protection against high medical 
expenses, they may have difficulty obtaining or maintaining adequate insurance coverage due to the 
medical underwriting practices health insurers use to classify and price risks and to define and limit 
coverage for individuals and groups (Field and Shapiro 1993; Stone 1993).  Using data from both 
healthy and chronically ill individuals in Indiana, we examined the effect of health status on three levels of 
coverage: adequate insurance, underinsurance, and uninsurance.  We found that the presence of a 
chronic illness decreased the probability of having adequate insurance, particularly for single individuals.  
Chronic illness decreased the probability of having adequate coverage by about 10 percentage points 
among all individuals and by about 25 percentage points among single individuals.  We also found that a 
key insurance characteristic that influenced adequacy was a permanent preexisting condition exclusion.  
Such exclusions are now prohibited under most health plans as of 1997 by the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (Public Law 104-191).  Thus, rigorous enforcement of 
HIPAA will help to promote adequate health coverage for seriously ill people. 
 
Insurance Market Factors Affecting Coverage 
 
 Using the Current Population Survey, it was estimated that between 39 and 42 million 
Americans, representing 17 percent to 18 percent of the non-elderly population, were uninsured in 
1996 (Blumberg and Liska 1996).  Although the majority of Americans have health insurance, there is 
considerable variation in the type and extent of coverage (Ginsburg, Gabel, and Hunt 
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1998; Sullivan and Rice 1991).  As many as 16 percent to 19 percent of insured individuals are 
inadequately insured (or underinsured) with coverage that could leave them exposed to large out-of-
pocket expenses in the event of a serious illness (Short and Banthin 1995). 
Medical Underwriting Practices  
According to an Institute of Medicine Report (Field and Shapiro 1993), the difficulty obtaining 
or maintaining adequate coverage could result from medical underwriting practices of health insurers that 
segment less healthy individuals into separate risk pools (Field and Shapiro 1993; Light 1992).  
Experience rating is one form of medical underwriting in which insurers set premiums and other terms of 
policies based on characteristics such as age, gender, occupation, and health status (Light 1992).  
Insurers assume that some employment-based groups are at greater risk of incurring medical 
expenditures due to the serious illness of one or more employees or due to the overall demographic 
composition of the group.  For such groups, insurers may use experience rating to charge above-
average premiums, impose more coverage restrictions, or refuse coverage (Buchmueller 1995).  
Underwriting practices also include waiting periods, upper limits on the amount that the policy will pay, 
and exclusions of coverage for certain procedures, test, or drugs (Light 1992).  In addition, underwriting 
practices may result in permanent exclusions of coverage for preexisting health conditions (Buchmueller 
1995; Light 1992; Cotton 1992). 
Coverage for less healthy individuals may also be reduced by “policy churning,” renewal 
underwriting, and within-group underwriting (Light 1992).  Policy churning occurs when a firm switches 
policies just as the preexisting condition exclusion period ends and the premiums would increase.  The 
firm’s new policy costs less than renewing the old policy.  However, the new policy contains a new 
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preexisting condition exclusion period for less healthy employees (Light 1992).  With renewal 
underwriting, potentially costly medical conditions that employees develop are added to the list of 
conditions that are excluded from coverage under the renewed policy.  Finally, within-group 
underwriting involves singling out less healthy individuals within a group for higher premiums or 
decreased coverage (for example, a reduced maximum lifetime payout for their illness) (Freudenhiem 
1992; Light 1992).   
If higher risk individuals are segmented to separate risk pools as a result of medical underwriting 
practices, they might face restricted coverage, higher premiums, or both (Beauregard 1991; Light 1992; 
Field and Shapiro 1993; Stone 1993; Buchmueller 1995).  Medical underwriting practices resulting in 
higher premiums may cause individuals to select a lower level of coverage or forgo coverage entirely.  
Such higher premiums could also cause firms to offer reduced coverage or no coverage at all 
(Buchmueller 1995; Kolata 1992).  Thus, medical underwriting practices may inhibit seriously ill 
individuals from obtaining adequate health insurance. 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
 In June 1997 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (Public Law 
104-191) went into effect to mitigate some of the more problematic underwriting practices.  
Specifically, HIPAA limits an insurer’s ability to impose permanent preexisting condition exclusions on 
individuals who already have health insurance and move to a new group.  In addition, HIPAA prohibits 
charging higher premiums to individuals within a group due to their illness.  Consequently, HIPAA may 
curtail policy churning and some forms of within-group underwriting.  
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Clearly HIPAA, which assures portability of health insurance from plan to plan and restricts 
preexisting condition exclusions and other underwriting limits for the chronically ill, is a significant health 
care reform.  However, HIPAA’s scope is not complete. 
HIPAA does not prohibit the reduction of coverage for specific illness (for example, by 
lowering maximum lifetime payouts for the illness), nor does HIPAA limit premiums insurers can charge.  
Moreover, there is evidence that insurers are responding to HIPAA with higher cost health insurance 
and even avoiding statutory requirements in some cases (Pear 1997; Kuttner 1997).  Indeed, President 
Clinton recently announced an Executive Branch initiative to strengthen federal enforcement of HIPAA 
(Mohammed 1998).  Thus, despite HIPAA, serious or chronic illness might continue to adversely affect 
the adequacy of coverage, and additional health insurance reform may be warranted. 
 
Defining Adequacy of Coverage 
 
 Although much research has focused on the characteristics and numbers of uninsured (for 
example, Swartz 1997; Blumberg and Liska 1996; Rowland, Lyons, Salganicoff, and Long 1994; 
Moyer 1989; Short et al. 1988 ) and the problems the uninsured may face obtaining access to health 
care (for example, Ayanian, Kohler, Abe, and Epstein 1993; Spillman 1992; U.S. Congress 1992), less 
research has focused on the adequacy of coverage for insured individuals (Monheit 1994).  However, 
even insured individuals may face major financial problems due to illness (Bodenheimer 1992).  
Consequently, it is also important to identify individuals who may be inadequately insured. 
Previous Research Defining Adequate Coverage 
Short and Banthin (1995) estimated the number of individuals with inadequate coverage using 
the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES).  In their study, they placed individuals into a 
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high-risk group if the individuals’ expected medical expenses exceeded the 75th percentile of 
expenditures in the sample, and they placed the remaining individuals into the low-risk group.  Then, 
they defined the inadequately insured (or underinsured) as individuals whose insurance coverage would 
not prevent out-of-pocket expenditures from exceeding 10 percent of their annual family income if they 
faced the average medical expense of individuals with the highest 1 percent of expenditures in their risk 
group.  Using the preceding definition of underinsurance, Short and Banthin found that about 19 percent 
of the non-elderly insured individuals were inadequately insured.   
Short and Banthin (1995) also estimated the percentage of people who were inadequately 
insured by comparing the actuarial value of individuals’ policies with the actuarial value of the Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield policies offered to federal employees.  The actuarial value of each policy in the 
NMES was calculated as the percentage of total medical expenditures that were covered on average 
for individuals with a particular policy.  When actuarial value of each individual’s policy was compared 
with the actuarial value of the federal employee benefit package (estimated to cover 71 percent of 
medical expenditures), about 16 percent of insured individuals were underinsured. 
In another study, Bashshur, Smith, and Stiles (1993) developed a taxomony of benefit 
packages.  Bashshur et al. divide insurance coverage into four categories: excessive coverage, full 
coverage, adequate coverage, and underinsurance.  Excessive coverage exists when there is redundant 
coverage for the same services.  Full coverage exists when, aside from any premium payments, no 
additional out-of-pocket payment is required.  Adequate coverage exists when some cost sharing is 
required through deductibles and coinsurance in addition to any premium payments, but the cost sharing 
does not limit access to needed medical services.  Underinsurance exists when the out-of-pocket 
payments that may be required when an individual faces a medical event interfere with the individual’s 
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ability to obtain needed medical care or if the out-of-pocket payments result in a serious financial 
burden.   
It is important to note that Bashshur et al. measured underinsurance in terms of both insurance 
characteristics and individuals’ perceptions of their coverage.  Specifically, insurance is considered 
inadequate in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) too few services are covered, (2) out-of-
pocket expenditures are excessive regardless of family income, and (3) consumers perceive their 
insurance is inadequate. 
Adequacy Defined for the Current Study 
To define adequacy of coverage for our study, we have drawn on the taxonomy of benefit 
packages discussed by Bashshur et al. (1993).  Using their scheme, individuals may be uninsured or fall 
into one of the four insurance categories described above.  However, individuals may face financial 
difficulties due to illness only if they are uninsured or underinsured.  Consequently, we have focused on 
only three groups: the adequately insured, underinsured, and uninsured.  Our adequately insured 
category also includes individuals who were excessively or fully insured in the categorization scheme of 
Bashshur et al.  We have categorized individuals as underinsured rather than adequately insured if they 
had coverage that could not prevent a medical event from becoming financially catastrophic, requiring 
substantial out-of-pocket expenditures.   
 Using Wyszewianski’s (1986) definition, a financially catastrophic medical event is different 
from a high-cost medical event.  A medical event is high cost if it results in expenses that exceed some 
high-cost threshold, while a medical event is catastrophic if it results in out-of-pocket expenditures that 
exceed a large portion of an individual’s family income (Wyszewianski 1986).  A high-cost event is not 
catastrophic if the individual has ample insurance and other financial resources to cover the resulting 
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medical expenses.  However, a high-cost (or even a low-cost) medical event may become catastrophic 
if the individual’s insurance coverage and financial resources are not sufficient to cover the medical 
expenses (Wyszewianski 1986).  Consequently, we have developed a definition underinsurance that 
incorporates both characteristics of individuals’ coverage and their level of income.  
Without a limit on out-of-pocket medical expenditures, a high cost medical event could become 
catastrophic for both higher and lower income individuals.  As a result, we have categorized insured 
individuals as underinsured if their policies contained characteristics that might leave them exposed to 
unlimited medical expenses.  Such characteristics include: (1) a permanent preexisting condition 
exclusion; (2) no annual out-of-pocket limit on medical expenditures (that is, no a stop loss limit); or (3) 
a lifetime maximum payout of ≤ $50,000.  
 Furthermore, higher levels of cost sharing may be increasingly burdensome for lower income 
individuals.  Consequently, we have incorporated the level of income into our definition of inadequate 
coverage.  We also classify lower income individuals as underinsured if their insurance required a large 
degree of cost sharing due to: (4) a yearly deductible > $1,000; (5) coinsurance rates for hospitalization, 
physician services or prescription drugs > 20 percent or coinsurance rates for outpatient mental health 
services > 50 percent; or (6) an exclusion of coverage for hospitalization, physicians services, 
prescription drugs, or outpatient mental health services.  The insurance characteristics we used are 
similar to indicators of underinsurance used in other research (Short and Banthin 1995; Bashshur et al. 
1993; U.S. Congress 1990).  The low-income threshold used in the models presented was a family 
income of $15,000 or less, which is similar to the federal poverty line in 1995 of $15,150 for a family of 
four (Blumberg and Liska 1996).   
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In addition, we estimated models in which preexisting condition exclusions were not used to 
determine the level of coverage.  As of June 1997, HIPAA limits the use of permanent preexisting 
condition exclusions for individuals who have group coverage or who have made the transition from 
group coverage to individual coverage.  As a result, estimating the effect of the health status and other 
covariates on the level of coverage after removing preexisting condition exclusions provides a simulation 
of the effect of HIPAA, possibly indicating whether HIPAA will alter the effect of health status and 
other covariates on the level of coverage. 
 
Methods 
 
We have estimated the effects that chronic illness and other covariates have on the probability of 
being uninsured, underinsured, or adequately insured.  To estimate the effect of chronic illness on the 
adequacy of coverage, we have examined data from both healthy and chronically ill individuals.  The 
data and the empirical estimation procedures are described in the following sections. 
Data  
 The data for our study come from two 1994 samples in Indiana.  We focused on one state to 
control for differences in coverage that could be attributed to different state policies and conditions.  
Indiana’s uninsurance rate is 14.3 percent for the non-elderly compared with the national average of 
17.7 percent (Winterbottom, Liska, and Obermaier 1995).  Indiana has one of the nation’s oldest state 
high-risk health insurance pools (Bovbjerg and Kollar 1986).  This high-risk pool provides health 
insurance for individuals definitively denied coverage by private health insurers at rates somewhat higher 
than market rates for individual insurance.  Also, Indiana has adopted modest insurance market reform 
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with limits on medical underwriting and mandated rate bands.  Managed care penetration in Indiana is 
limited but increasing (Ginsburg and Fasciano 1996). 
The first sample used in our study, called the South Bend Sample, was drawn from a stratified 
random sample of households in St. Joseph County, Indiana (the greater South Bend MSA), for a 
separate study of hypertension by the Indiana State Department of Health (Murphy 1993).  Two 
methods were used to obtain the sample: (1) a county-wide, random-digit dialing of households, and (2) 
a house-to-house survey of households in 13 census tracts with high proportions of minorities and low-
income people.  Each nonelderly resident (aged 19 to 64) in the Department of Health study was ask to 
participate in our study.  The Department of Health forwarded the names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers to project investigators at Indiana University.  Of the 1,225 random contacts, 329 were too 
old (65+) to participate in our study.  Of the remaining 896 individuals, 508 (57 percent) agreed to 
participate in our study (Kinney et al. 1997).   
Questionnaires were sent to the individuals in the South Bend Sample asking for information 
about their health status.  Based on the questionnaires, the respondents were divided into two groups 
depending on whether they suffered from a serious illness.  The illnesses consisted of 23 serious 
conditions that affect the major organs including: heart disease, diseases of the nervous system, lung 
diseases, diseases of the glandular system, kidney diseases, liver diseases, skeletal diseases, muscle 
diseases, diseases of the immune system, drug or alcohol addiction, serious mental illness, high 
cholesterol, and cancer (Kinney et al. 1997).  In all, there were 242 respondents in the South Bend 
Sample who completed the interviews (Kinney et al. 1997).   
In the South Bend Sample, we oversampled among poor and minority individuals.  Such 
individuals have higher incidence of chronic and other serious illnesses (Institute for Health and Aging 
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1996).  Previous research has found that telephone survey response rates tend to be lower among 
lower-income populations because of their distrust of telephone surveys generally and the lack of 
continuous telephone service (Groves et al. 1988). 
 The second sample, called the “Cancer Sample,” comprised two groups of cancer patients: (1) 
women with breast cancer and (2) men with testicular cancer.  The sample of women with breast cancer 
was drawn from the tumor registries of the seven hospitals that treat over 90 percent of the women with 
breast cancer in Marion County, Indiana (the greater Indianapolis MSA) who resided in Marion 
County, had been diagnosed or treated in the study hospitals, were diagnosed or treated for breast 
cancer between January 1987 and December 1990, and were between 19 and 64 years old at the time 
of the survey.  To protect confidentiality of patients, tumor registries contacted the patients and 
forwarded names of willing participants to project investigators.  Tumor registries contacted 821 
patients whom the hospitals recorded as having breast cancer during the relevant time interval.  Of the 
208 women who agreed to participate in the study, 34 (17 percent) had died, moved, were too ill, or 
were otherwise unreachable for a phone interview.  As a result, there were 174 women with breast 
cancer in the Cancer Sample (Kinney et al. 1997).  
 The sample of men with testicular cancer was comprised of male residents of Indiana between 
ages 18 and 64 and diagnosed between 1987 and 1990.  The sample was drawn from the tumor 
registry of Indiana University Medical Center (IUMC), which treats nearly all testis cancer patients in 
Indiana because oncologists at IUMC developed the prevailing treatment of testis cancer (Einhorn and 
Donohue 1977).  Of the 195 patients contacted, 41 men with testicular cancer completed the 
interviews.   
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 The Cancer Sample was draw from an administrative database, which is known to be unreliable 
in other contexts (Frey 1989).  Thus, we suspect that many of the individuals contacted might not have 
been eligible for the sample.  Because of confidentiality and liability concerns, the hospitals were 
unwilling to provide us with information on patients who declined to participate. 
Overall our sample study consisted of 457 individuals: 242 from the South Bend Sample (106 
healthy and 136 chronically ill individuals) and 215 from the Cancer Sample (174 breast cancer and 41 
testicular cancer patients).  Individuals in all samples were called for a phone interview about their health 
insurance benefits and job histories since 1984.  To obtain as much accuracy as possible and to enable 
respondents to check relevant records, the interviewers mailed follow-up questionnaires.   
We appreciate that our sample is not representative of the general population because 
individuals facing a serious illness were oversampled.  Research on the general population has reported 
difficulty detecting problems specific to seriously ill people because few seriously ill people occur in the 
samples of the general population (Monheit 1994).  We deliberately selected samples with ill individuals 
so that we could make more detailed inferences about such individuals.  Using a non-random sample 
that oversampled the chronically ill was not problematic for the empirical estimates because the 
oversampling was based on the presence of a chronic illness and not on the characteristics of coverage, 
which were the outcome variables of interest in the current study.  
 Although our samples are drawn from different geographic locations, they are both within the 
Indiana.  Thus, individuals in both samples face the same regulatory environment in the insurance 
market.  Moreover, the variation in the populations of St. Joseph County (South Bend) and Marion 
County (Indianapolis) where most sample members live are quite limited.  Specifically, rates of chronic 
illness, cancer, uninsurance, and poverty do not vary greatly between the two urban areas of St. Joseph 
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and Marion counties, according to data from the Indiana State Department of Health.  Nevertheless, the 
South Bend sample does contain a larger portion of lower income and minority individuals because we 
oversampled.  To control for potential differences between these groups, we included a dichotomous 
covariate indicating whether the individual was from the South Bend sample or from the Cancer sample, 
which consisted of patients from the greater Indianapolis MSA.   
 All samples contain information on six characteristics of individual’s health insurance policies 
that, according to our definition of adequacy discussed above, could leave individuals exposed to large 
amounts of uncovered financial risk.  The six characteristics are:  
 
1. A permanent preexisting condition exclusion;  
 
2. No annual out-of-pocket limit on medical expenditures (that is, no stop loss limit);  
 
3. A lifetime maximum payout of ≤ $50,000;  
 
4. A high yearly deductible (> $1,000);  
 
5. High coinsurance rates for hospitalization, physician’s services or prescription drugs (> 20 
percent) or high coinsurance rates for outpatient mental health services (> 50 percent); and  
 
6. an exclusion of coverage for hospitalization, physician’s services, prescription drugs or 
outpatient mental health services.   
 
Each of the six characteristics has been coded as a dichotomous variable indicating the presence of the 
characteristic.  Demographic characteristics of individuals are shown in Table 1 and insurance 
characteristics are shown in Table 2. 
Empirical Test 
We have used characteristics of coverage along with income to categorize individuals as 
uninsured, underinsured, or adequately insured.  To determine whether the presence of a chronic illness 
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decreased the probability of having adequate coverage, we used an ordered probit model, which 
allowed us to estimate the effects that a set of covariates had on the probability that an individual had 
one of the three levels of coverage.  The following ordered probit model was used: 
 Prob[y = j] = Φ [µj – (β0 + β illIll + β ′x)] – Φ [µj-1 – (β0 + β illIll + β ′x)]  (1) 
where: y = 0 (uninsured), y = 1 (underinsured), and y = 2 (adequately insured), Ill is a dichotomous 
variable equal 1 if the individual had a chronic illness and 0 if the individual did not have a chronic illness, 
x is a vector of other covariates, and µj is the jth  threshold parameter with µ–1 = –∞, µ0 = 0, and µ2 = 
+∞.  The model was estimated using maximum likelihood (Green 1991, 1993). 
The sign of each coefficient gives the effect that the covariate has on the probability that y 
assumes its highest level, which represents adequate insurance in our model.  If the value of β ill is 
negative, the presence of a chronic illness decreased the probability of having adequate insurance.   
Marginal Effects 
In addition to determining whether the presence of a chronic illness affected the level of 
coverage, we also estimated the magnitude of the effect.  The marginal effect of a covariate gives the 
change in the probability of having each level of coverage resulting from a change in the covariate.  The 
marginal effect of being ill on the probability of having each level of coverage can be estimated by 
calculating the difference in each of the following probabilities from equation (1) when Ill = 0 and Ill = 1 
with all other covariates held at the value of a reference person (Green 1993): 
Prob[y = 0 (uninsured)]               = Φ[– (β illIll +β ′ x)] 
Prob[y = 1 (underinsured)] = Φ[µI – (β illIll +β ′ x)] – Φ[ – (β illIll +β ′ x)] (2) 
Prob[y = 2 (adequately insured)] = 1 – Φ[µ1 – (β illIll +β ′ x)].   
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Severity of Illness 
In addition to the examination of the effect of illness on the adequacy of health insurance 
coverage described above, we sought to determine how greater severity of illness might affect the 
adequacy of coverage.  To measure the impact of severity of illness, we used indicators of the self-
reported health status of individuals and the number of comorbid conditions.  The measure of self-
reported health status consisted of three dichotomous covariates, indicating whether the individual 
reported that they were in excellent/very good health, good health, or fair/poor health.  We use 
excellent/very good health as the omitted reference category.  We used the number of comorbid 
conditions as a measure of severity of illness.  For the South Bend sample, we had more information 
about individual’s medical conditions and were able to examine the relation between the number of 
comorbid conditions and insurance adequacy.  We included a dichotomous covariate in our models that 
indicated whether the individual had only one condition and an additional covariate that indicated 
whether the individual had two or more comorbid conditions.  Because the number of comorbid 
conditions was not available in the Cancer sample (we knew only that the individuals had cancer), our 
examination of severity of illness was restricted to the South Bend sample. 
Firm Size and Chronic Illness 
 Because underwriting practices are most prevalent in the small group and individual insurance 
markets, we have explored the impact of both having a chronic condition and working in a small firm.  
To do so, we included a covariate in the model indicating whether the individual worked in a small firm 
or was self-employed (Smll) a covariate representing the interaction between working in a small firm or 
being self-employed and having a chronic illness (Ill_Smll).  We restricted our sample to individuals 
who were employed.   
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Results 
 
 The effects of the health status and other covariates on the level of coverage are presented in 
Tables 3 and 4.  In the top half of each table, insured individuals were categorized as underinsured, 
rather than adequately insured, if they had any of the insurance characteristics that would not place an 
upper limit on potential out-of-pocket medical expenditures (characteristics (1) – (3) in the Methods 
section).  In addition, low-income insured individuals were also considered underinsured if they had any 
of characteristics that would require a large amount of cost sharing (characteristics (4) – (6) in the 
Methods section).  In the bottom half of each table, insured individuals were categorized as 
underinsured rather than adequately insured in the same manner as in the top half, except the presence 
of a permanent preexisting condition exclusion was not used as criterion for determining the level of 
coverage.   
 In Table 3, we have presented the estimated coefficients from the ordered probit and the 
implied marginal effects of the Ill covariate, which indicates whether the individual had a chronic illness.  
In Table 4, we have presented the coefficients of all covariates included in the models.  The marginal 
effect of the Ill covariate was calculated holding all other covariates at the values of three specific 
reference persons, chosen to represent a range of individuals.  
 The first reference person is a married, white female with a high school diploma who works full 
time.  The second reference person is a married, white male with a college degree who works full time.  
The third case reference person is a single, non-white female with a high school diploma who does not 
work full time.  All three reference people are 45 years old, have one child, work in a large firm, and are 
not self employed. 
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Results for All Individuals 
 The following sections explore the effect that illness and other covariates had on all individuals in 
the sample.  Because married individuals may have alternative sources of income and coverage through 
a spouse, we examined married and single individuals separately to determine whether factors affecting 
the level of coverage differ by marital status. 
 Effect of Health Status on the Level of Coverage.  The results in the top half of 
Table 3 indicate that the presence of a chronic illness had a significant negative effect (p = 0.02) on the 
probability that an individual had adequate coverage.  The results show that an individual in the first 
reference case had a 75 percent probability of having adequate coverage if the individual was not 
chronically ill and a 65 percent probability of having adequate coverage if the individual was chronically 
ill.  The presence of a chronic illness decreased the probability of having adequate coverage by 10 
percentage points.  For an individual in the second reference case, the probability of having adequate 
coverage was 80 percent if the individual did not have a chronic illness and 71 percent if the individual 
did have a chronic illness.  The presence of chronic illness decreased the probability of adequate 
coverage by 9 percentage points.  For an individual in the third reference case, the probability of having 
adequate coverage was 42 percent if the individual did not have a chronic illness and 31 percent if the 
individual did have a chronic illness.  The presence of a chronic illness reduced the probability of having 
adequate coverage by 11 percentage points.  Thus, the presence of a chronic illness decreased the 
probability of having adequate coverage for each reference case by about 10 percentage points.   
 In addition, for both individuals in the first and second reference cases, the presence of a 
chronic illness increased the probability of being underinsured by 7 percentage points and increased the 
probability of being uninsured by 2 – 3 percentage points.  For an individual in the third reference cases, 
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the presence of a chronic illness increased the probability of being underinsured by 3 percentage points 
and increased the probability of being uninsured by 8 percentage points. 
 The model in the bottom half of Table 3 is similar to the model in the top half, except the 
presence of a preexisting condition exclusion was not used to determine the level of coverage.  When 
the level of coverage did not depend on the presence of a preexisting condition exclusion, health status 
no longer had a significant effect on the adequacy of coverage.   
To determine whether the results were sensitive to alternative specifications of the level of 
coverage, we estimated several additional models.  The two models described above were estimated 
using $25,000 as the low-income threshold.  The presence of a chronic illness reduced the probability 
of adequate coverage by about 10 percentage points when preexisting condition exclusions were 
included among the criteria for determining the level of coverage but did not have a significant effect 
when preexisting condition exclusions were not included.   
In addition, we estimated two models in which income was removed as a criterion for 
determining the level coverage.  The categorization was based only on characteristics of coverage 
(characteristics (1) – (3) in the Methods section) that would not place an upper limit on potential out-of-
pocket medical expenditures.  Preexisting condition exclusions were included in one model and 
excluded in the other.  Again, the results were similar to the results described above.  Removing income 
as a criterion did not have a substantial effect because most low-income individuals who had high 
deductibles, high coinsurance rates, or service exclusions also had a preexisting condition exclusion, no 
annual limit on out-of-pocket expenditures, or a lifetime maximum payout of ≤ $50,000.  As a result, 
most low-income individuals who were categorized as inadequately insured when income was among 
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the criteria for determining the level of coverage remained inadequately insured after income was 
removed as a criterion. 
In summary, our results provide evidence that underwriting practices in the insurance market 
had a significant effect in reducing the level of coverage for chronically ill individuals.  However, among 
all individuals in the sample, the reduction in level of coverage due to illness resulted mainly from 
permanent preexisting exclusion restrictions that would be limited under HIPAA rather than other 
characteristics of coverage.   
 Effect of Non-Health Covariates on the Level of Coverage.     In addition to 
estimating the effect of health status on the level of coverage, we also estimated the effect of other 
covariates (including demographic and employment-related characteristics) on the level of coverage.  
The effects of the covariates on the level of coverage (Table 4) are generally the results that would be 
expected. 
 The effects of the demographic and education characteristics show that individuals with more 
opportunities for coverage are more likely to have adequate coverage.  Married individuals were more 
likely to have adequate coverage, possibly reflecting the fact that married individuals have more potential 
sources of income and insurance coverage.  In addition, individuals with higher levels of education were 
more likely to have adequate coverage relative to individuals who did not graduate from high school.  
The increased probabilities of adequate coverage may indicate that more educated individuals have 
better job opportunities with better benefits. 
 In addition to including the level of education, which may influence the level of coverage by 
affecting the quality of jobs available, we have also included work-related characteristics (firm size, full-
time status, and self-employment status) directly in the models.  Small firms may face higher costs of 
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obtaining health insurance, and as a result, they may be more likely to offer reduced coverage or offer 
no coverage at all (Monheit 1994).  As expected, individuals who worked in a large firm had a greater 
probability of having adequate coverage relative to individuals who worked in small firms or who were 
unemployed.  In the model presented, we considered firms large if they had more than 100 employees.  
We also estimated the models using 50 employees as the threshold for classifying firms as large, but the 
results did not change substantially. 
Regardless of firm size, individuals who are employed full time (≥ 35 hours/week) are more 
likely to be eligible for coverage relative to other workers.  The results indicate that being a full-time 
employee increased the probability of being adequately insured.  As expected, our results also show 
that being self-employed reduced the probability of being adequately insured.  Self-employed individuals 
have less incentive to obtain adequate insurance due to tax laws that limit the portion of expenditures on 
coverage that they can deduct (Fuchs 1996).  In addition to firm size, full time status, and self-
employment status, we estimated models that included categorical variables representing occupation and 
industry.  However, none of the estimated coefficients were significant and were not presented. 
 The models presented were estimated both including and excluding the presence of a permanent 
preexisting condition exclusion as a criterion for determining the level of coverage.  A comparison of the 
results in the top and bottom halves of Table 4 indicates that the absence of permanent preexisting 
condition exclusion did not change the sign or significance of the covariates in most cases.  Thus, some 
individuals (such as, part-time workers or workers in small firms) have a greater probability of having 
coverage that could leave them exposed to large out-of-pocket expenses if a serious illness were to 
occur due to insurance characteristics not affected by HIPAA. 
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Regardless of whether the presence of a preexisting condition exclusion was used to determine 
the level of coverage, we found that the geographic group did not have significant effect on the 
probability of having adequate coverage among the married individuals.  However, among the single 
individuals, we found that being in the South Bend sample decreased the probability of having adequate 
coverage.  Our results highlight the difficulty that low-income single individuals (whose options for 
coverage are more limited) may have obtaining adequate health insurance coverage. 
Married Individuals 
Married individuals have more potential sources of income and coverage (through a spouse’s 
employer) than single individuals, and are thus more likely to have access to adequate insurance.  
Among married individuals, we found that health status did not affect the probability of having adequate 
coverage regardless of whether we used preexisting condition exclusions to determine the level of 
coverage (Table 3).  Furthermore, the results did not differ substantially with alternative model 
specifications when $25,000 was used as the low-income threshold or when income was excluded from 
the criteria for determining the level of coverage. 
When we included indicators of self-reported health status (excellent/very good health, good 
health, or fair/poor health) in the models, we did not find a significant relation between the self-reported 
health status indicators and insurance adequacy.  Moreover, among the married individuals in the South 
Bend sample (n = 298), having a greater number of comorbid conditions did not significantly effect the 
adequacy of coverage, regardless of whether the presence of a preexisting condition exclusion was used 
to determine the level of coverage. 
Among the working married individuals (n = 214), we found that neither the coefficient on Ill 
(indicating that the individual had a chronic illness) nor Ill_Smll (indicating that the individual had a 
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chronic illness and worked in a small firm or was self-employed) was significant, regardless of whether 
used preexisting exclusion restrictions to determine the level coverage. 
Single Individuals 
Although health status did not have a significant effect on the level of coverage among married 
individuals, health status was a significant factor affecting the level of coverage among single individuals, 
who may have fewer alternative sources of coverage.  When permanent preexisting condition exclusions 
were used to determine the level of coverage, chronic illness decreased the probability of having 
adequate coverage by about 25 percentage points among all reference case individuals (Table 3).  
When permanent preexisting condition exclusions were not used to determine the level of coverage, 
chronic illness decreased the probability of having adequate coverage by 15 to 20 percentage points for 
all reference cases (Table 3).  Furthermore, the results did not differ substantially with alternative model 
specifications when $25,000 was used as the low-income threshold or when income was excluded from 
the criteria for determining the level of coverage.  Thus, for single individuals, HIPAA may diminish but 
not eliminate the effect of health status on the level of coverage.  
 Severity of Illness.     We did not a significant relation between the self-reported health 
status indicators and insurance adequacy.  However, among single individuals in the South Bend sample 
(n = 159), having a greater number of comorbid conditions did have an impact on the adequacy of 
coverage.  When preexisting condition exclusions were used to define the level of coverage, we found 
that having one condition reduced the probability of adequate coverage by about 30 percentage points 
for an individual in the first or second reference case and by about 35 percentage points for an individual 
in the third reference case.  Having two or more comorbid conditions reduced the probability of 
adequate coverage by about 40 percentage points for an individual in the first or second reference case 
 
 
22 
and by about 43 percentage points for an individual in the third reference case.  Thus, having two or 
more comorbid conditions decreased the probability of adequate coverage by 8 to 10 percentage 
points more than having only one or two comorbid conditions.   
 When the presence of a preexisting condition exclusion was not used to determine the level of 
coverage, having two or more comorbid conditions also had a greater impact on the probability of 
adequate coverage than having only one condition.  However, the impact was reduced.  Having one 
condition reduced the probability of adequate coverage by about 25 percentage points for an individual 
in the first or second reference cases and by about 28 percentage points for an individual in the third 
reference case.  Having two or more comorbid conditions reduced the probability of adequate coverage 
by about 31 percentage points for an individual in the first or second reference cases and by about 34 
percentage points for an individual in the third reference case.  Thus, when preexisting condition 
exclusions were not used to determine the level of coverage, having two or more comorbid conditions 
decreased the probability of adequate coverage by nearly six percentage points more than having only 
one condition. 
 Firm Size and Chronic Illness.     Among the working single individuals (n = 116), we 
did find that being chronically ill and working in a small firm were associated with the level of coverage.  
When preexisting condition exclusions were used to determine the level of coverage, we found that the 
coefficient on Ill was marginally significant (p = 0.072), but the coefficient on Ill_Smll was not 
significant (p = 0.175).  However, when preexisting condition exclusion were not used to determine the 
level of coverage, we found that the coefficient on Ill was no longer significant (p = 0.203), but the 
coefficient on Ill_Smll was significant (p = 0.0572).  Our findings imply that preexisting condition 
exclusions were not limited to individuals who worked in small firms.  However, other characteristics of 
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coverage may be related to firm size, making adequate coverage especially difficult for single workers 
with chronic illnesses who work in small firms.  
The results from our probit models are consistent with the results from Chi-square comparisons 
of each of the six characteristics of coverage versus firm size.  We found that the presence of a 
preexisting condition exclusion was independent of firm size.  However, we found that the portion of 
individuals with service benefit exclusions and high deductibles was significantly higher among individuals 
in small firms. 
 
Discussion 
 
Overall, the results have shown that the presence of a chronic illness decreased the probability 
of having adequate coverage by about 10 percentage points, increased the probability of being 
underinsured by 3 to 7 percentage points, and increased the probability of being uninsured by 2 to 8 
percentage points among all individuals in the sample.  There may be several reasons underlying the 
association between a reduction in the probability of adequate coverage and serious chronic illness.  The 
association between inadequate coverage and chronic illness may reflect characteristics of the insurance 
market such as medical underwriting practices that tend to segment less healthy individuals into separate 
risk pools.  The association between inadequate coverage and chronic illness may also result from 
characteristics of individuals.  For example, individuals with serious chronic illnesses may have lower 
levels of coverage because the illness has limited their capacity or assertiveness, thereby impeding their 
ability to be effective self-advocates in choosing adequate coverage.  In the current study, we have 
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explored the potential association between underwriting practices, chronic illness, and insurance 
adequacy.   
A major factor that contributed to inadequate insurance among individuals with a chronic illness 
was a medical underwriting practice in which insurers exclude coverage for medical conditions that 
existed prior to the time the individual’s policy was issued.  However, the ability of insurers to impose 
permanent preexisting condition exclusions on individuals who have group coverage or who made the 
transition from group coverage to individual coverage is limited under HIPAA.  When permanent 
preexisting health condition exclusions were not used to determine the level of coverage, chronic illness 
no longer had a significant effect on the level of coverage among all individuals in the sample.  Our 
findings emphasize the impact of rigorous enforcement of HIPAA.  However, it is important to note that 
will HIPAA will do nothing to protect chronically ill individuals who do not have insurance coverage in 
the first place. 
 Because married individuals may have alternative sources of income and coverage through a 
spouse, we examined married and single individuals separately.  For married individuals, chronic illness 
did not have an effect on the level of coverage, regardless of whether preexisting condition exclusions 
were used to determine the level of coverage.  However, among single individuals, chronic illness 
significantly decreased the probability of having adequate coverage.   
 When permanent preexisting condition exclusions were used to determine the level of coverage, 
chronic illness decreased the probability of having adequate coverage among single individuals by about 
25 percentage points.  When permanent preexisting condition exclusions were not used to determine the 
level of coverage, chronic illness decreased the probability of having adequate coverage among single 
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individuals by 15 to 20 percentage points.  Thus, for single individuals, HIPAA may reduce but not 
eliminate the effect of health status on the level of coverage.   
HIPAA could potentially increase the probability of adequate coverage among chronically ill 
single individuals by 5 to 10 percentage points; however, the effect of HIPAA may be reduced if it is 
not fully enforced.  Enforcement of HIPAA may be hampered if states do not enact legislation to require 
compliance with the provisions of HIPAA (U.S. GAO 1998).  In states failing to enact such legislation, 
enforcement will be left to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  According to a 
General Accounting Office report, HHS resources have been strained as its regulatory role has 
expanded into five states failing to enforce some provisions of HIPAA, and HHS resources will be 
strained further if it expands its regulatory activities into other states not enforcing some provisions of 
HIPAA (U.S. GAO 1998).  As of October 1997, four states where HHS enforcement activities have 
not begun had not placed limits on preexisting condition exclusions in large group markets (U.S. GAO 
1998).  With a lack of enforcement by some states and with limited resources for enforcement by the 
federal government, the potential impact of HIPAA may be diminished. 
The impact of HIPAA on the level of coverage may be diminished further if insurers who are 
unable to use preexisting condition exclusions increase their use of other medical underwriting practices, 
increasing the price of coverage for chronically ill individuals.  Although HIPAA does limit the use of 
permanent preexisting condition exclusions for individuals who have group coverage or who have made 
the transition from group coverage to individual coverage, HIPAA does not prohibit all forms of medical 
underwriting.  Other medical underwriting practices such as lowering the maximum lifetime payout for 
specific diseases might still be permitted under HIPAA.  If insurers are no longer able to impose 
permanent preexisting condition exclusions, they might respond for example by limiting the maximum 
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payout for illnesses that they previously excluded from coverage.  In addition, evidence suggests that 
individuals eligible for coverage in the individual market under HIPAA may face premiums that are 140 
percent to 600 percent of the standard rates (U.S. GAO 1998).  Future research might address the 
extent to which limitations in the use of permanent preexisting condition exclusions results in increased 
use of other underwriting practices.  
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Table 1.    Demographic Characteristics of Study Sample 
 
Variable 
All 
Individuals 
(n = 457) 
Married 
Individuals 
(n = 298) 
Single 
Individuals 
(n =159) 
Mean (Std. Dev.)    
Age  45.9 
(11.9) 
 
47.07 
(10.8) 
43.71 
(13.4) 
Number of Children 1.0 
(0.4) 
1.20 
(1.4) 
0.56 
(1.2) 
    
Percent (%)    
Chronically Ill 76.8 78.5 73.6 
Female 70.5 71.8 67.9 
Non–white 20.1 15.1 29.6 
Married 65.2 100.0 NA 
Spouse Works 51.2 78.5 NA 
    
INCOME LEVEL:    
$14,999 or Less 17.9 8.4 36.3 
$15,000 – $24,999  15.3 9.4 26.4 
$25,00 – $34,999  19.0 21.1 15.1 
$35,000 – $49,999 18.4 21.5 12.6 
$50,000 or More 29.3 39.6 10.1 
    
EDUCATION:   
Less than High School Diploma 10.1 9.1 11.9 
High School Diploma 35.5 33.9 38.4 
Some College or Technical School 24.7 24.5 25.2 
College Degree 13.8 14.1 13.2 
Some Post–Graduate or Graduate Degree 16.0 18.5 11.3 
    
EMPLOYMENT STATUS:    
Unemployed 27.8 28.2 27.0 
Employed in Small Firm (≤ 100 Employees) 23.5 23.1 15.7 
Employed in Large (>100 Employees) 51.6 48.7 57.2 
Employed Full Time (≥ 35 Hours/Week) 57.8 57.7 57.9 
Self–Employed 8.5 1.0 0.6 
Source: The Robert Wood Johnson Barriers to Health Insurance Project, 1994. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.    Insurance Characteristics of Study Sample 
 
 
All Individuals 
(%) 
(n = 457) 
Married 
Individuals 
(% ) 
(n = 298) 
Single Individuals 
(%) 
(n = 159) 
Level of Coverage    
Uninsured 62 
(13.6) 
 
30 
(10.1) 
32 
(20.1) 
Preexisting Condition Exclusions Included     
   Underinsured 160 
(35.0) 
 
104 
(34.9) 
56 
(35.2) 
   Adequately Insured 235 
(51.4) 
 
164 
(55.0) 
71 
(44.7) 
Preexisting Condition Exclusions Excluded    
   Underinsured 135 
(29.5) 
 
89 
(29.9) 
46 
(28.9) 
   Adequately Insured 260 
(56.9) 
 
179 
(60.1) 
81 
(50.9) 
    
Insurance Policy Characteristics    
Permanent Preexisting Condition Exclusion 32 
(7.0) 
 
17 
(5.7) 
15 
(9.4) 
No Annual Out of Pocket Limit  126 
(27.6) 
 
85 
(28.5) 
41 
(25.8) 
Lifetime Maximum Payout ≤ $50,000 2 
(0.4) 
 
2 
(0.7) 
0 
(0.0) 
High Yearly Deductible 18 
(3.9) 
 
13 
(4.4) 
5 
(3.2) 
High Coinsurance Rates 19 
(4.2) 
 
13 
(4.4) 
6 
(3.8) 
Service Exclusions  66 
(14.4) 
 
49 
(16.4) 
17 
(10.7) 
Source: The Robert Wood Johnson Barriers to Health Insurance Project, 1994 
 
 
 
Table 3.    Probability of Coverage Level by Health Status Calculated from 
Ordered Probit Results of Study Sample, 1994a 
(in percents) 
 
Reference Person 1b Reference Person 2c Reference Person 3d 
VARIABLE: ILL 
Adequately 
Insured 
Under– 
Insured Uninsured 
Adequately  
Insured 
Under– 
Insured Uninsured 
Adequately 
Insured 
Under–
insured Uninsured 
 Preexisting Condition Exclusions Included 
  
 All 
(N = 457; Coefficient: –0.29; P–value: 0.02)e 
Probability if Ill  65 29 6 71 25 4 31 45 24 
Probability if Not Ill  75 22 3 80 18 2 42 42 16 
Marginal Effect of Being Ill on Prob.  –10 7 3 –9 7 2 –11 3 8 
    
 Married 
(N = 298; Coefficient: –0.06; P–value: 0.37)e 
Probability if Ill 65 30 5 73 24 3 48 41 11 
Probability if Not Ill 67 29 4 75 23 3 50 40 10 
Marginal Effect of Being Ill on Prob. –2 1 1 –2 2 0 –2 1 1 
    
 Single 
(N = 159; Coefficient: –0.70; P–value: 0.00)e 
Probability if Ill 51 37 12 56 35 10 26 43 31 
Probability if Not Ill 76 21 3 80 18 2 52 37 12 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.    Continued 
 
Reference Person 1b Reference Person 2c Reference Person 3d 
VARIABLE: ILL 
Adequately 
Insured 
Under– 
Insured Uninsured 
Adequately  
Insured 
Under– 
Insured Uninsured 
Adequately 
Insured 
Under–
insured Uninsured 
 Preexisting Condition Exclusions Not Included 
  
 All 
(N = 457; Coefficient: –0.16; P–value: 0.14)e 
Probability if Ill 70 24 6 78 19 4 41 38 21 
Probability if Not Ill 75 20 4 82 16 3 47 36 17 
Marginal Effect of Being Ill on Prob. –5 4 2 –4 3 1 –6 2 4 
          
 Married 
(N = 298; Coefficient: 0.06; P–value: 0.37)e 
Probability if Ill 71 25 5 77 20 3 56 34 10 
Probability if Not Ill 68 26 6 75 22 4 54 35 11 
Marginal Effect of Being Ill on Prob. 3 –1 –1 2 –2 –1 2 –1 –1 
          
 Single 
(N = 159; Coefficient: –0.50; P–value: 0.02)e 
Probability if Ill 60 29 12 70 23 7 38 36 26 
Probability if Not Ill 77 18 4 85 13 2 58 30 13 
Marginal Effect of Being Ill on Prob. –17 11 8 –15 10 5 –20 6 13 
     aAll three reference people are age 45, have one child, work in a large firm, and are not self–employed. 
     bA married, white female with a high school diploma who works full–time. 
     cA married, white male with a college degree who works full–time. 
     dA single, non–white female with a high school diploma who does not work full–time. 
     eBecause we have a hypothesis about the sign of the coefficient, we report the p–value for a one–tailed test. 
Source:  The Robert Wood Johnson Barriers to Health Insurance Project, 1994. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.    Results from Ordered Probit Models in Study Sample, 1994 
 
ALL (N = 457) MARRIED (N = 298) SINGLE (N = 159) 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P–Value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P–Value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P–Value 
  
 Preexisting Condition Exclusions Included 
Constant 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.28 0.50 0.57 0.14 0.57 0.81 
Ill  –0.29 0.14 0.02 –0.06 0.19 0.37 –0.70 0.24 0.00 
          
Demographic Characteristics:          
Age 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.92 0.02 0.01 0.11 
Female 0.29 0.14 0.04 0.17 0.18 0.34 0.42 0.23 0.07 
Non–White –0.15 0.14 0.30 –0.08 0.20 0.67 –0.26 0.25 0.29 
Number of Children –0.08 0.04 0.07 –0.11 0.05 0.04 –0.09 0.09 0.33 
Marrieda 0.35 0.13 0.00 Not Included   Not Included   
Spouse Works a Not Included   0.26 0.18 0.07 Not Included   
          
Education:b          
High School Diploma 0.41 0.19 0.04 0.69 0.24 0.01 –0.05 0.38 0.90 
Some College 0.54 0.21 0.01 0.75 0.26 0.00 0.22 0.41 0.59 
College Degree 0.87 0.25 0.00 1.07 0.31 0.00 0.49 0.48 0.30 
Some Post–Graduate or Graduate 
Degree 
0.73 0.23 0.00 0.91 0.28 0.00 0.25 0.52 0.63 
          
Work Characteristics:a          
Works in Large Firm (> 100 Employees) 0.21 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.38 0.27 0.08 
Works Full Time (≥ 35 hours/week) 0.39 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.17 0.03 0.42 0.26 0.06 
Self Employed –0.51 0.18 0.00 –0.56 0.22 0.01 –0.50 0.41 0.11 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.    Continued 
 
ALL (N = 457) MARRIED (N = 298) SINGLE (N = 159) 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P–Value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P–Value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P–Value 
  
 Preexisting Condition Exclusions Not Included 
Constant –0.03 0.33 0.93 0.21 0.51 0.69 0.26 0.56 0.64 
Ill –0.16 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.19 0.37 –0.50 0.23 0.02 
          
Demographic Characteristics:          
Age 0.00 0.01 0.46 –0.00 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.01 0.29 
Female 0.29 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.38 0.49 0.23 0.03 
Non–White –0.17 0.14 0.25 –0.07 0.20 0.72 –0.30 0.25 0.23 
Number of Children –0.05 0.04 0.22 –0.10 0.05 0.07 –0.04 0.10 0.72 
Marrieda 0.31 0.13 0.01 Not Included   Not Included   
Spouse Works a Not Included   0.29 0.19 0.06 Not Included   
          
Education:b          
High School Diploma 0.41 0.19 0.03 0.79 0.25 0.00 –0.20 0.37 0.58 
Some College 0.51 0.21 0.01 0.83 0.27 0.00 –0.00 0.39 0.99 
College Degree 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.41 0.32 0.00 0.56 0.46 0.23 
Some Post–Graduate or Graduate 
Degree 
0.74 0.24 0.00 0.96 0.29 0.00 0.22 0.51 0.66 
          
Work Characteristics:a          
Works in Large Firm (> 100 Employees) 0.26 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.27 0.52 0.27 0.03 
Works Full Time (≥ 35 hours/week) 0.30 0.14 0.02 0.28 0.18 0.06 0.26 0.26 0.16 
Self Employed –0.43 0.19 0.01 –0.52 0.22 0.01 –0.29 0.41 0.24 
     aBecause we have hypotheses about the signs of these coefficients, we report the p–values for a one–tailed test for noted covariates.  For all other covariates, we report 
the p–value for a two–tailed test. 
     bIndividuals are in an education category if it is the highest level of education that they received.  The probabilities for each category are calculated relative to having less 
than a high school diploma. 
Source:  The Robert Wood Johnson Barriers to Health Insurance Project, 1994. 
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